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L,es solidarites entre generations 
'Solidarities between Generations 
•. • - 1 
~ 1 'ample.ur des enjeux humains, economiques et sociaux poses par Ja question des solidarites entre 
Lgenera:Hons a conduit l'lnternationaJ society of Family Law (ISFL) a choisir ce theme pour son 
- XV congres mondial. · 
Plus de 200 intervenants, venus de 50 pays, ont aborde ces questions saus l'angle juridique, mais 
_ -atissi phjlosophique, economique et anthropologique. Cet ouvrage presente une partie de ces 
; commU:nications organisees autour de deux grands themes : l'enfant au creur des solidarites 
_ fcimiliales et la prise en char9e des ~ines par la famille. 
Des phenomenes tels que l'allongement de la duree de la vie, l'urbanisation des populations, la 
difficulte d'entree sur le marche du travail ou encore l'eclatement des modeles familiaux traditionnels 
marquent notre monde conternporain et impliquent la disparition d'anciennes solidarites et 
· 1;~pparition de nouve11es solidarites redessinant les relations entre generations, posant a1ors 1e 
< .• probleme du sort des personnes les plus fragiles : les enfants, les malades, les handicapes et, surtout, 
1es-personnes agees. 
-Que1 est a1ors le röle de Ja famille et des collectivites dans la protection de ces personnes ? 
: Quels rapports entre solidarites pubJiques et solidarites privees ? 
-Quels sont 1es droits et libertes reconnus aux personnes que l'äge, la rnaladie ou Je handicap, 
: placent en situation de dependances ? 
_ Tel~~~ sont les questions au creur de cet ouvrage. 
· The importance of the human, econornic and social issues caused by the question of generations' 
· _ I. solidarities led the International Society of Family Law to choose this theme for its XVlth World 
'.__,- ~o~gress . (Lyon, July 19-23rd 2011). More than 200 speakers frorn 50 countries studied these questions 
; '. f!om the legal angle, bu~ also philosophic, economic and anthropologica1. This werk co1lects apart of 
. · these papers about tWo great issues: the child, as the center of family solidarities; and the support for 
. e1ders by family . . 
Phenomena su~h as increasing life expectancy, population urbanization, 1abor-market entry barriers, 
· · · decline of traditional family pattems, rnark in depth our contemporary wor1d and invo1ve old 
solidarity disappearance and new solidarity ernergence, reshaping relations between generations 
.·. while bringing up the prob lern of the fate of the rnost vulnerable: children, the sick, disabled, and 
.1 - eSpecially elderly people. 
- Whatthen is.the role of farriilies and communities in protecting these peop1e? 
-What is the.relationship between public and private solidarity? 
- What are the rights and freedoms of people placed by age, illne~s or disabi1ity in a dependence 
. -situation? 
· ~ese are the issues addressed by the authors of this book . 
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lNTRODUCTION 
There are great differences between Civil Law and Cormnon Law legal sys-
tems when it comes to support obligations within the family. 
In general, in Civil law legal systems there are unrestricted support obli-
gations of parents towards their children-minor as well as adult-and recip-
rocal obligations of children towards their parents (1), the only prerequisite 
being need on the part of the person asking for support and financial ability 
to provide such support on the other side. The roots of this system can be 
traced back as far as to Roman law (2). 
Comrnon law legal systems start from the opposite pole. Even as regards sup-
port obligations of parents towards minor children, these had only be enacted 
in England by the Elizabethan Poor Laws in the beginning of the 17th century 
imposing for the first time statutory child support obligations (3). To the very 
day the starting point in Cormnon Law countries is that parents have a duty to 
support their minor children but this duty ends upon the child reaching major-
ity although the age of majority during the last decades has been lowered to 18 
almost everywhere (4). Likewise there are no support obligations of children 
(1) See for Germany §§1602 para 1, 1603 para 1 BGB, France Art 205 Ce, Belgium Art 203, 205 
Ce, Italy Art 433 No. 2, 3 Ce, Luxembourg Art 205 Ce, Spain Art 143 Ce. 
(2) I. ScHWENZER, Verwandtenunterhalt und soziodemographische Entwicldung, Zeitschrift für 
das gesamte Familienrecht (FamRZ), 1989, 685 ff. 
(3) S. Bmw, "Parrmtal, support of adult chUdren with disabilities," 91 Minn.L.Rev. 710, 713 
(2007). 
(4) England: Child Support Act 1989, Child Support Act 1991, app. 1 § 4, see also J. EEKELAAR, 
Family Solidarity in English Law, in: D. ScHWAB and D. HENRrcH, Familiäre Solidarität, Beiträge 
zum europäischen Familienrecht, Bielefeld 1997, 63 ff.; I. ScHWENZER, FamRZ 1989, 685, 685 ff. 
For USA s1:ate law see L.W. MoRGAN, The duty to support adult disabled children, Divorce Litig., 
October 1997, 185; S. Bmw, 91 Minn.L.Rev. 710, fn. 60 (2007). 
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towards their parents in need. More and more systems formerly sharing the 
· Civil law background, such as the N etherlands (5) and the Scandinavian legal 
systems, nowadays also follow the Common law approach (6). 
In this paper we will discuss the consequences of these two different 
approaches as regards the support obligations of parents towards their adult 
children. The main focus will be on support for educational purposes and 
support for disabled children. For the Civil Law legal systems we will ana-
lyze the situation in German and Swiss law; for the Common Law legal sys-
tems we will discuss the current situation in the USA by way of example. 
1. - SUPPORT FOR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES 
A. German and Swiss Law 
As in Civil law legal systems parents are generally obliged to support the 
children without a general limitation this duty naturally encompasses sup-
port during the time when the child is not able to support itself because 
it pursues a higher education. However, recent years have seen the endea-
vour of courts in Germany as well as in Switzerland to limit this support 
obligation. 
First of all, educational support can only be asked for an education befit-
ting the child's intellectual capacities and desires, and ends with the first 
qualification which allows entering a profession (7). lt has been held that a 
bachelor degree does not yet fulfil this requirement but that the support duty 
continues until the master degree has been achieved. Especially Gerrnan 
courts have developed meticulous guidelines with regard to the necessary 
relationship between the bachelor and the master studies (8) as well as con-
cerning the question whether after an apprenticeship that qualifies for a pro-
fession - such as a car mechanic - support for university studies - such as 
engineering - may be claimed (9). In any event, the studies must be pursued 
(5) See art. 392 BW: Generally the parents of the child are not obliged to provide for the liv-
ing costs during the time of studying at university after the child reached majority. Maintenance 
claims may be extended until the age of 21 during the time of education (art. 392, para 2 BW). 
(6) Denmark: According to § 14, para 2 Child Gare Act the parental duty ends when the child 
reaches majority at the age of 18 or at marriage, even though a facultative support for education 
can be claimed until the age of 24 (§ 14, para 3 Child Gare Act). Compare for Norway: Generally 
until child reaches majority (aged 18), continuing in case of financial ability of the parents (§§ 66-68 
statute No. 7, 8 avril 1981); for Sweden see chap. 7 §§ 1 et seq. Föräldrabalken: until the age of 18. 
(7) For German Law see § 1610 para 2 BGB; 379; BGH, 14 July 1999, FamRZ 2000, 420, 420 ff.; 
BGH, 17 May 2006, XII ZR 54/04. 
(8) OLG Celle, 2 February 2010, FamRZ 2010, 1465 ff. 
(9) See BGH, 17 May 2006, FamRZ 2006, 1100, 1101. 
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with ordinary diligence and must be finished within an average period of 
time (10). However, support does not extend to PhD-studies (11). 
Still, it is clear that such support obligations for educational purposes 
may well last for a considerable time, often until the child is well in it's 
mid to late twenties. Hence, it is quite understandable that courts are seek-
ing to further limit the parents' support obligations. As there are no other 
statutory restrictions - especially no fixed age limits - courts tend to con-
sider the personal relationship between the parents and the children (12). 
Support may not be asked for if the child has breached its obligations of 
familial solidarity. This obviously resembles the fault principle that has 
been abandoned in cases of spousal support already decades ago. Not sur-
prisingly it is relied upon especially in cases of children of divorced par-
ents. fypically, after years of experience of high conflict within the fam-
ily the child refuses contact to the non-custodial parent, mostly the father, 
who in turn typically is the one to be able to financially support the child. 
In numerous decisions it has been held that an adult child stubbornly refus-
ing contact with the parent is in breach of its reciprocal familial duties and 
thus not entitled to support (13). The facts of some of the cases are quite 
drastic, such as a child refusing contact with its father addicted to alcohol 
and accused of sexual abuse (14), or with a mother who had made avail-
able personal data of the daughter via the internet and furthermore was a 
member of a radical sect (15). Even the fact of a daughter living in a non-
marital relationship that was not approved by the parents gave rise to a 
denial of educational support (16). 
Finally, a singular feature of German law is often used to reject a young 
adult's claim for educational support; the parents' right to dictate the child 
to receive support in natura in the household of the parents (17). Again, 
mostly children of divorced parents are thereby affected. fypically, the father 
has founded a new family and - to escape hiss support obligations towards 
the child from the former family - now - after many years of having lived 
apart-offers this child to move in with him and his new family. 
(10) OLG Naumburg, 26 February 2004, FamRZ 2004, 1456, 1456; OLG Sachsen-Anhalt, 
12 January 2010, FamRZ 2010, 1245 et seq.; OLG Hamm, 13 February 2004, FamRZ 2005, 60. 
(11) OLG Hanun, 9 August 1989, FamRZ 1990, 904, 905. 
(12) See § 1611 para 1 BGB: grave misconduct rnay cause the end of the duty. 
(13) OLG Frankfurt, 21 Decernber 1989, FamRZ 1990, 789, 790. Similarly, see for Switzerland 
BGer, 24 September 1987, BGE 113 II 374 et seq. 
(14) OLG Hamm, 12 January 1995, FamRZ 1995, 958, 959. 
(15) OLG Celle, 4 July 2001, FuR 2002, 332 ff. 
(16) AG Garrnisch-Partenkirchen, 29 October 2009, FamRZ 2010, 990, 991; AG Garmisch-
Partenkirchen, 26 July 2010, 1 F 265/09. 
(17) See § 1612 para 2 BGB. 
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Many Gennan courts have approved of such an offer and denied the claim 
of the child for monetary support (18). 
B. US American law 
As has been mentioned in US law parents are under an obligation to sup-
port their minor children. This former Common law principle has been laid 
down in statutes in most US states during the last decades (19). 
Since the 1970s there has been some discussion whether having regard to 
the lowering of the age of majority on the one hand and the ever increasing 
divorce rate on the other there should be a support obligation at least for 
the education of children of divorced parents. 
Indicative for the legal development are illinois on the one hand and 
Pennsylvania on the other. In 1978 in Illinois the Supreme Court (20) upheld 
a statute (21) giving the divorce court the power to make « provision for 
the education and maintenance of the child whether of minor or majority 
age » (22). This was regarded as discriminating against divorced parents. 
Conversely, in Pennsylvania the Supreme Court in 1992 decided that no sup-
port obligation exists for the college education of an adult child (23). As a 
result of that decision the legislator intervened by promulgating the statuto:ry 
possibility for the court to « order either or both parents who are separated, 
divorced, unmarried or otherwise subject to an existing support obligation 
to provide equitably for educational costs of their child » (24). However, the 
Supreme Court (25) in turn held this statute to be unconstitutional because 
of violating the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment by privileg-
ing certain classes of children over others. 
Today, state statutes typically and indiscriminately provide for support 
obligations towards minor children. Support obligations typically end upon 
the child reaching majority or being otherwise emancipated. Some add sup-
port obligations until the child has reached the age of nineteen or twenty-
one and /or has graduated from high school (26). 
(18) OLG Schleswig, 13 January 1998, FamRZ 1998, 1195, 1196; BayObLG, 19 May 1999, 
FamRZ 2000, 976, 977. 
(19) For an overview about existing state law see L.W. MoRGAN, Divorce Litigation„ October 
1997, at 185. 
(20) Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 71 lli. 2d 563, 376 N.E. 2d 1382 (1978). 
(21) Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Ill Rev. Stat 1977, eh. 40, para 101 ff.). 
(22) Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 71 lli. 2d 582. 
(23) Blue v. Blue, 532 Pa 521, 616 A 2d 628, 523 ff. (1992). 
(24) 23 Pa.C.S. § 4327(a). 
(25) Gurtis v. Kline, 542 Pa 249, 666 A 2d 265 (1995). 
(26) Cornpare for exarnple Hawai: Haw. Rev. Stat. § 580-47(a): until age of 19; Indiana: Ind. 
Code § 31-ll-5-12(d)(l): until the age of 21 or in case of child's aptitude and ability during the 
time of an appropiate post-secondary education. 
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II. - SUPPORT FOR DISABLED ADULT CHILDREN 
A. German and Swiss law 
According to the general principle under Gerrnan and Swiss law parents 
have a duty of support if an adult child is not able to support itself due to 
disability. However, there are strong tendencies to relieve parents of dis-
abled children from their ongoing support obligations. lt must be empha-
sized that in Germany as weil as in Switzerland in these cases it is not the 
disabled child who sues its parents but it is the state providing for the living 
of the disabled in the first place in form of social security payments and dis-
ability benefits, and then seeking reimbursement from the parents by way 
of subrogation. 
In Switzerland, the father of a forty-year-old drug addict with work 
incapacity was not obliged to pay for the support of his son. The court 
thereby among others heavily relied on the fact that there had been no 
contact between father and son for 25 years and the son had changed his 
name (27). 
In Germany, the legislator stepped in. If the state contributes to the 
living and care of a disabled adult person recourse against its parents is 
limited to an amount of now maximum EUR 46 (28). In case of hardship 
recourse may be even totally denied (29). The privilege of the parents of 
disabled adult children in Germany stands in strong contrast to the situ-
ation of children having to support their disabled parents. The only stat-
utory exclusion of the state's recourse in these cases relates to hard-
ship (30). Case law, however, is extremely harsh on children. Thus very 
recently hardship has been denied by the Gerrnan Supreme Court (31) in 
the case of a 49-year old son who had severely suffered from a schizo-
phrenic mother throughout from the time of being an infant. Out of a net 
monthly income of about EUR 3,000 he was obliged to pay EUR 700 per 
month to the support of his mother. The court held that because of fam-
ily solidarity the fate of disability in these cases must be borne by the 
nuclear family (32), the privilege of parents of disabled children not being 
extended to this situation. 
(27) BGer, 21 Feb 2002, 5C.298/2001 with note T. KoILER, Juslette:r, 8th April 2002; see also 
BGer, 28 August 2009, BGE 136 III 1. 
(28) § 94(2) SGB XII, BGH, 23 June 2010, XII ZR 170/2008. 
(29) § 94(3) SGB XII, see also BGH, 15 September 2010, XII ZR 148/09. 
(30) § 94(3) no 2 SGB XII. 
(31) BGH, 15 September 2010, XII ZR 148/09, FamRZ 2010, 1888. 
(32) But see BGH, 21 April 2004, FamRZ 2004, 1097: when disability is consequence of war 
hardship can be found. 
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B. US American law 
In the US in recent years support obligations of parents towards disabled 
adult children have received much attention (33). Although in the US, too 
) this mechanism is frequently used to reimburse the state for the costs of hos-
pitalization, it is still remarkable that case law suggests that also children 
themselves are suing their parents (34). 
An overview of the solutions found in the 50 states reveals three possi-
ble approaches (35): 
The first one is the traditional Common Law approach; support obliga-
tions are limited to the minority of the child regardless of existing or subse-
quent disabilities (36). 
In the second group - almost half of all states - it is decisive whether the 
disability arose before or after the child having reached the age of major-
ity. Whereas in the first case the support obligation of the parents subsists, 
it does not revive in the second scenario (37). From a dogmatic viewpoint 
it is deemed that the inability to self-support prevents the child's emancipa-
tion (38) and thus he or she remains a minor in the eyes of the Iaw. 
The third group of states provides for ongoing support obligations of the 
parents towards their disabled children regardless when the disability occurred 
and how Iong it lasts. A prominent example of the latter group is California 
and the case Culp v. Culp (39) that received much attention from the family 
Iaw community. A 50-year old son - a graduate from Stanford Law School -
after having practised family law for 19 years claimed to suff er from depres-
sion and bipolar disorder; the Ventura Superior Court held that he was entitled 
to ongoing support in the amount of 3500 USD per month from his parents. 
CoNCLUSION 
Starting from different poles the results achieved in Germany and 
Switzerland on the one hand and in the US on the other are quite astonishing. 
(33) McCartney v. McCartney, 11 So. 3d 213 at 219 (AlaCiv.App. 2007): "[„.] the adult child is 
so rnentally or physically disabled that he cannot support hirnself or herself. "; Jayw v. Jayw, 248 
P. 3d 1219 (Haw.App. 2011); Willens v. Garcia, 2011 WL 222150 (FlaApp.3.Dist. 2011). 
(34) See only S. BuHAI, Parental Support of Adult childrm with Disabilities, 91 Minn.L.Rev. 
710 ff. (2007) with further references. 
(35) See for details S. BuHAI, 91 Minn.L.Rev. 710 at 721 ff. 
(36) See for details S. BuHAI, 91 Minn.L.Rev. 710 at 723 ff. 
(37) See for details S. BuHAI, 91 Minn.L.Rev. 710 at 730 ff. 
(38) See Hanson v. Hanson, 625 A.2d 1212 at p. 1214 (Pa Super.et. 1993). 
(39) Culp v. Culp, Ventura Super. Ct., dec 29, 2000; discussed by S. BuHAI, 91 Minn.L.Rev. 710 
at 711. 
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Whereas the starting point of unrestricted support obligations between par-
ents and children and vice versa in Gerrnan and Swiss law might suggest 
that adult children can count on support by their parents, reality looks dif-
ferent. The unrestricted support obligations thernselves induce courts to use 
any legal device to possibly restrict these. This works especially to the det-
riment of children of divorced parents who are thus often re-traurnatized. In 
contrast, US law that in general does not know ongoing support obligations 
seems to be more cognizant of the special situation of children of divorced 
parents. The case of disabled children is especially revealing. Whereas in the 
US more and more states provide for support obligations towards disabled 
adult children, Gerrnan law seerns to go the opposite way. One might just 
speculate why recourse of the state against parents of disabled children is 
limited to a derisory amount; maybe the aim is to encourage parents of dis-
abled children not to abort them. 
In the end the question must be answered why we need legal support obli-
gations and how far they should be extended ( 40). Certainly, moral duties to 
support members of the same family who are in need do exist in most soci-
eties. And these moral duties are in fact fulfilled in most cases. The major-
ity of students are supported by their parents enabling them to cover the 
costs of living and studying. And the majority of disabled children and old 
aged persons are living within the family being cared for and supported by 
family members notwithstanding whether legal support obligations exist or 
not ( 41). These families have to be further encouraged and supported for 
example via tax reductions or the like. Legal support obligations, however, 
rather deter than promote voluntary support within the family especially if 
the members of the family have been estranged for years following a break-
down of the family. And where legal support obligations aim at securing 
recourse by the state against family members they enhance the risk that 
people in need forgo social security payments and disability benefits just to 
avoid the close family members to be subject to such state recourse ( 42). 
All in all limiting support obligations in principle to minor children seerns 
to be the solution to be preferred. However, having in mind that almost half 
of the children nowadays come from divorced parents ( 43) provision should 
be made that these children have equal opportunities as their fellow stu-
(40) I. ScHWENZER, Reform des Verwandtenunterhalts - Eine rechtspolitische Notwendigkeit 
oder übereilte Aufgabe der Familiensolidarität?, in Brühler Schriften zum Familienrecht, VoL 
8, Zehnter Deutscher Familiengerichtstag, Bielefeld 1994, pp. 59 ff. See also C. KRAus, Grundlagen 
des Unterhaltsrechts, Schriften zum Familien - und Erbrecht, Vol. 3, Baden-Baden 2011, 100 ff. 
(41) See S. BUHAI, 91 Minn.L.Rev. 710 at 751. 
( 42) See C. KRAus, (fn. 40), 99. 
(43) C. KRAus, (fn. 40), 31. 
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dents from so-called intact famllies where parents usually pay educational 
support voluntarily. Thus the support obligation should be extended to cover 
the costs for an education beyond majority. For reasons of clarity and pre-
dictability there should be a precise age limit beyond which support can no 
longer be asked for. Which age this should be will probably depend on the 
respective educational system that varies from country to country. lt seems 
conceivable that an age of 24 or 25 appears reasonable for most legal sys-
tems. Such a system will not only protect young adults but also serve legit-
imate interests of parents as regards planning reliability. 
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